Ruling deems her liable with pet owners under dog owners' statute
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the summary dismissal of claims for damages against the owners of a dog who had attacked a dog walker upon determining that the employee was in a position to control the pet’s behaviour at the critical time.
In Nigro v. Luciano, 2026 ONCA 283, the respondents had two dogs, including a boxer without a prior history of aggressive behaviour. They hired a dog-walking company.
The appellant, a part-time employee of the company, began walking the boxer in November 2021. In February 2022, the dog developed an infection in his foot. The veterinarian suggested letting him wear rubber booties when walking in wet areas.
In March 2022, the appellant was alone in the respondents’ house. Due to the snow and mud outside, she decided to put booties on the boxer before leaving the house.
When the appellant approached the dog with the booties, he lunged at her, bit her arm, and began shaking it. After she freed her arm, he kept biting. She sustained injuries to her abdomen, left upper thigh, and both arms.
In an action against the respondents, the appellant claimed total damages of $1 million, comprising general damages of $350,000 and special damages of $650,000. She alleged that the respondents – as owners of the dog under Ontario’s Dog Owners’ Liability Act, 1990 (DOLA) – were strictly liable for damages under the legislation.
The respondents moved for summary judgment. They argued that the appellant was also an owner under the DOLA, which held all the dog’s owners jointly and severally liable.
In February 2025, Justice Vanessa Christie of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the respondents’ motion. Applying the principles in Wilk v. Arbour, 2017 ONCA 21, the motion judge considered the appellant an owner under the DOLA.
On appeal, the appellant asserted that Wilk was distinguishable from this case for two reasons. First, she alleged that the respondents, as homeowners and dog owners, were liable for the boxer’s actions because the attack had occurred in their home.
Second, the appellant argued that she was not a true owner because she had passively followed the respondents’ instructions, which had asked her to let the dog wear booties before letting him walk outside.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal and awarded the respondents all-inclusive costs of $5,000, as agreed.
Given the statutory definition of a dog owner, as interpreted in Wilk, the appeal court considered the appellant an owner of the boxer under the DOLA. The appeal court explained that she:
The appeal court addressed the appellant’s arguments. First, the appeal court ruled that the location of the attack did not govern liability.
The appeal court noted that the DOLA expressly ousted the application of Ontario’s Occupiers’ Liability Act, 1990, in connection with the owner’s liability, if the dog bite happened on the owner’s premises.
According to the appeal court, through the DOLA, the legislature sought to:
Per the appeal court, permitting an owner under the DOLA to evade liability merely because they were in someone else’s home at the time of the dog bite would defeat the legislative objective.
Second, the appeal court noted that dog owners commonly gave directions to those they hired to care for, feed, walk, and give medication to their pets. The appeal court explained that the person possessing the dog would be in the best position to determine whether, when, and how to execute the instructions.
The appeal court pointed out that Wilk did not limit liability to those with the highest level of authority over the dog. The appeal court added that the DOLA did not require the possessor to be the dog’s sole owner or to act exclusively on her own volition.
According to the appeal court, through the DOLA’s definition of owners as those who possessed or harboured a dog, the legislature aimed to “impose liability on persons who had less than the full collection of rights belonging to an owner but who had attributes of ownership, possession and harbouring (providing safe shelter to the dog) where a measure of control over the dog is exercised.”
Regarding the hypothetical situations the appellant raised during oral arguments, the appeal court found it unhelpful to speculate on how the DOLA would apply to imaginary cases that were all very different from the present case.
The appeal court noted that the question of whether someone was an owner under the statute depended on the specific facts and context.
