INCOME TAXRebates received by appellant were shareholder benefits and were taxableAppellant worked for company belonging to his father. Appellant and his brothers were sole directors and shareholders of company. During taxation years at issue company purchased life insurance for father of appellant as well as for appellant and his three brothers. Appellant received cheque by insurance company in 2000 for amount of $15,000 representing insurance rebate. Appellant did not claim amount of $15,000 on his income tax return. Appellant also received cheques from insurance company in 2002 for amounts of $8,430 and $34,630. Minister reassessed appellant and added to appellant’s income for 2000 and 2002 taxation year’s amounts of $15,000 and $43,060, respectively. Minister also assessed penalties in amounts of $1,816 and $4,972 for 2000 and 2002 taxation years. Appellant appealed. Appeal dismissed. Rebates received by appellant were shareholder benefits and were taxable. Rebates were too important to be considered a gift. There was gross negligence on part of appellant and penalties were justified in the circumstances. Lapalme v. Canada (Aug. 25, 2011, T.C.C., Favreau J., File No. 2008-4008(IT)G) Reasons in French. 206 A.C.W.S. (3d) 628 (22 pp.).
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPLegal tests to be applied to determine employment status were not consideredThis was appeal and cross-appeal from judge’s decision varying assessments. Appellant engaged truck drivers to provide services to client. Respondent determined that 96 truck drivers engaged by appellant in 2002, 2003 and 2004 were employees. Respondent assessed appellant for premiums payable under Employment Insurance Act (Can.), and contributions payable under Canada Pension Plan. Appellant appealed. Judge divided workers into two groups. One group was made up of 43 drivers who had signed agreement with appellant and other group was 53 drivers for whom there was no evidence of written agreement. Judge concluded that 53 drivers were employees of appellant but other 43 drivers were not. Appeal allowed; cross-appeal dismissed. Judge did not err in considering two groups of drivers separately. Judge appeared to have considered that any driver who had signed one of 43 agreements was incorporated drivers but that finding was based on misapprehension of facts. Of 43 drivers who signed agreements only 2 were incorporated drivers. As result of judge’s approach to 43 drivers who had signed agreements, legal tests to be applied to determine whether they were employees were not considered. Agreement signed by drivers contained clauses that suggested common intention that driver would be engaged as person carrying on own business but other factors must be considered. Appellant did not supervise drivers. Drivers did not provide own trucks or equipment or bear any costs of operating trucks. Contracts provided right to driver to substitute another driver at own cost but there was no evidence that any driver exercised right. Drivers did not bear any financial risk related to any investment in trucks or equipment. Drivers did not bear any responsibility for investing in anything that was required to fulfill contractual obligations or for managing work. Drivers did not negotiate rates of pay. Factors, on balance, weighed in favour of conclusion that drivers who signed agreements with appellant were employees, in contradiction to intention clauses. With respect to remaining 53 workers who did not sign agreements, judge’s conclusion that drivers were not self-employed was reasonable. Judge did not make error of law or palpable or overriding error of fact. TBT Personnel Services Inc. v. Canada (Sep. 22, 2011, F.C.A., Sharlow, Pelletier and Stratas JJ.A., File No. A-388-10) 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 477 (19 pp.).
RIGHT TO COUNSELPolice failed to fulfil duty to provide reasonable opportunity for accused to consult counsel of choiceApplication to exclude evidence. Motorist observed accused swerving into lanes without signaling, causing motorist to change lanes to avoid a collision. Motorist phoned police. Accused ignored officer’s police lights and siren for almost a kilometer while officer mouthed and signaled to him to pull over. Once stopped, officer observed extreme odour of alcohol emanating from vehicle and that accused’s eyes were red and bloodshot. Accused was arrested for impaired driving. At station, officer phoned lawyer of accused’s choice and left message. Officer then phoned duty counsel. Accused repeatedly and forcefully asked to speak to his own lawyer. Duty counsel phoned back and accused spoke to duty counsel. Another call was placed to accused’s lawyer of choice. Accused provided sample of his breath 10 minutes later. Application granted. Accused’s rights under ss. 8 and 9 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were not infringed. Officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arresting accused, based on extreme smell of alcohol in accused’s car when she opened door alone. Accused’s right to counsel of choice under Charter s. 10(b) was infringed. Police failed to fulfill their duty to provide reasonable opportunity for accused to consult counsel of his choice. Sarcastic and dismissive comments by officer undermined reasonable efforts. Accused’s right to instruct counsel was infringed when officer would not wait past approximately 10 minutes that had elapsed since second call to accused’s lawyer and in insisting that accused provide breath sample without providing reasonable explanation as to why he would not wait. To admit test results would bring administration of justice into disrepute. R. v. Samatar (Oct. 7, 2011, Ont. S.C.J., Knazan J.) 97 W.C.B. (2d) 443 (17 pp.).
APPEALNature of contract confirmed appellant was autonomousAppellant sought revision of Minister’s decision that dismissed application for employment insurance. Minister affirmed that appellant was not employee for concerned corporation and worked as autonomous throughout his contract. Appellant claimed that employee status was not mentioned in job offer letter but was discussed personally with representatives of corporation. Appellant affirmed that activities were supervised and that corporation exercised control over him. Appeal not allowed. Absence of fixed working hours, control over appellant’s work and great flexibility to perform activity confirmed appellant’s status of self-employed. Court underscored that nature of contract, establishing prospective gains and losses, confirmed that appellant was autonomous. Watzke v. M.N.R. (July 15, 2011, T.C.C., Miller J., File No. 2010-2371(EI); 2010-2372(CPP)) Reasons in French. 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 980 (8 pp.).
STAY OF PROCEEDINGSApplication judge failed to consider prejudice caused to alleged contemnorBoth appellant and respondent sought same relief, namely that stay imposed by application judge be set aside and that matter be returned to him for decision based on record before him. While judge has inherent jurisdiction to control process before him, and inherent jurisdiction to adjourn or stay proceeding, that discretion must be exercised judicially, with regard to potential prejudice caused by adjournment or stay. Here, application judge failed to consider prejudice caused to alleged contemnor, which was entitled to prompt resolution of allegations against it, based on evidence parties chose to put before court. Appeal was allowed. Stay imposed by application judge was set aside and matter ordered returned to him for decision on basis of record before him. Bremsak v. P.I.P.S.C. (Sep. 20, 2011, F.C.A., Dawson, Pelletier and Noel JJ.A., File No. A-160-11) 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 262 (4 pp.).
|
NO SUBSTANTIAL WRONGTrial judge erred in failing to leave attempted murderAccused charged with second degree murder. Accused alleged to have shot deceased in abdomen with sawed-off shotgun. Deceased died of a blood clot more than a month later and five days after being released from hospital. One expert witness testified that blood clot could have been caused by cocaine ingestion rather than by complications from the gunshot wound. Trial judge declined to leave attempted murder as available verdict and told jury they must acquit if they had reasonable doubt on causation. Accused convicted of second degree murder. Majority of Court of Appeal allowed accuseds’ appeal and ordered new trial. Crown’s appeal dismissed. Trial judge erred in failing to leave attempted murder. Curative proviso should not be applied. Availability of verdict of attempted murder may have affected jury’s determination on causation issue. Crown’s case on causation was not overwhelming. R. v. Sarrazin (Nov. 4, 2011, S.C.C., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ., File No. 33917) Decision at 90 W.C.B. (2d) 308 affirmed. 97 W.C.B. (2d) 192 (35 pp.).
PRIOR JUDICIAL DECISIONGovernment entitled to rely on judgments as precedents but not tender them into evidenceMotion by Ontario government for ruling on admissibility of prior judgments from other provinces as evidence on jurisdictional motion. Ontario government enacted Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2009 (Ont.), permitting actions to be brought against tobacco companies for recovery of tobacco-related health care costs. Ontario government commenced action in Ontario against 14 tobacco companies for recovery of $50 billion in tobacco-related health care costs. Similar proceedings had been commenced in British Columbia and New Brunswick by governments of those provinces. Six tobacco companies claimed to be foreign companies beyond jurisdiction of provinces. Foreign tobacco companies unsuccessfully brought motions in British Columbia and New Brunswick challenging jurisdiction of those courts. Foreign tobacco companies commenced motion in Ontario for order setting aside service ex juris of statement of claim and staying or dismissing action as against them on basis of lack of jurisdiction. Ontario government wanted to tender judgments of British Columbia and New Brunswick courts into evidence rather than just use them as authorities. Motion dismissed. Ontario government was entitled to rely on judgments as precedents but not tender them into evidence. Authority relating to use of factual findings in prior judgment was distinguishable. In present case, Ontario government was not seeking to rely on factual findings but rather legal analysis and conclusions. Ontario government was unable to point to any factual findings underlying conclusions in British Columbia and New Brunswick judgments that there was real and substantial connection with those provinces. Ontario v. Rothmans Inc. (Sep. 20, 2011, Ont. S.C.J., Conway J., File No. CV-09-387984) 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 485 (40 pp.).
AGREEMENTS FOR TRANSFER TO PENITENTIARYObjectives of international transfer of offenders scheme could not be achieved through transferApplication by Canadian prison inmate, who was incarcerated in an American prison after he was convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, for judicial review of a decision of Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Minister refused to approve applicant’s application under International Transfer of Offenders Act (Can.) to be transferred to Canada to serve remainder of his sentence. Reason was that objectives of international transfer of offenders scheme could not be effectively achieved through applicant’s transfer. Application dismissed. Minister properly exercised his discretion. Minister weighed purposes of Act, applicant’s positive and negative circumstances and relevant factors. One could reasonably conclude, based on information contained in record, that there was a factual basis for Minister’s decision and he was entitled to act as he did. Applicant was not denied procedural fairness. Court therefore deferred to Minister’s decision. Newberry v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (Nov. 3, 2011, F.C., Shore J., File No. T-1649-10) 97 W.C.B. (2d) 470 (19 pp.).
BOARDS AND TRIBUNALSNo authority in tribunal to award legal costsComplainant filed human rights complaint alleging the Canadian Forces discriminated against her on ground of sex, contrary to provisions of Canadian Human Rights Act. Canadian Human Rights Tribunal concluded sexual harassment complaint substantiated and awarded complainant $4,000 for suffering in respect of feeling or self-respect. Complainant applied for legal costs. Tribunal decided it had authority to award legal costs pursuant to s. 53(2) of Act, and awarded complainant $47,000 for legal costs. Attorney General of Canada’s application for judicial review of tribunal’s costs decision unsuccessful. Federal Court of Appeal allowed Attorney General’s appeal, concluding tribunal had no authority to make costs award. Appeal to Supreme Court of Canada dismissed. Tribunal’s decision to award legal costs reviewable on standard of reasonableness. Precise interpretative question before tribunal was whether words of s. 53(2)(c) and (d), which authorize tribunal to “compensate the victim . . . for any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice”, permit award of legal costs. Tribunal’s decision they did not reasonable. While words “any expenses incurred by the victim”, taken on their own, wide enough to include legal costs, when words read in statutory context, clear they cannot reasonably be interpreted as creating stand-alone category of compensation capable of supporting any type of disbursement causally connected to discrimination. Phrase appears twice and each reference to expenses preceded by specific, but different, wording. Expenses referred to in each paragraph take character from sort of compensation contemplated by surrounding words of each paragraph. Text, context and purpose of legislation clearly show that no authority in tribunal to award legal costs and no other reasonable interpretation of relevant provisions. Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat (Oct. 28, 2011, S.C.C., McLachlin C.J.C., LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ., File No. 33507) Decision at 312 D.L.R. (4th) 294, 182 A.C.W.S. (3d) 419 was affirmed. 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 185 (43 pp.).
SELF-GOVERNMENTAppeal tribunal did not respect procedure and parametersApplicant was candidate running for Chief in Band Council election. Applicant placed second by margin of three votes. Re-count reduced margin by two votes. Applicant launched appeal of election. Applicant challenged outcome of Band Council election. Appeal tribunal dismissed notice of appeal. Decision was signed by three individuals one of whom was not band member appointed to appeal tribunal. Application for judicial review was allowed. Appeal tribunal was “federal board, commission or other tribunal” for purposes of Federal Courts Act (Can.), and court had jurisdiction to consider application. Appeal tribunal did not respect procedure and parameters set out in Band’s Election Act. Appeal tribunal went beyond evidence referenced in notice of appeal and applicant’s affidavit of particulars in assessing whether there was sufficient evidence to move to second stage of appeal process. Appeal tribunal acted improperly and breached duty to act fairly. Appeal tribunal should have given applicant opportunity to hear and rebut opposing evidence in context of hearing. Appeal tribunal exceeded jurisdiction in assessing whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant appeal hearing. Appeal tribunal was not improperly constituted. Refusal by one of members to endorse preliminary ruling dismissing appeal was strong indication that there was sufficient evidence to warrant formal hearing. Felix v. Sturgeon Lake First Nation (Oct. 6, 2011, F.C., Bedard J., File No. T-667-10) 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 181 (25 pp.).
|